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One of the applications of quantum technology is to use quantum states and measurements to
communicate which offers more reliable security promises. Quantum data hiding, which gives the
source party the ability of sharing data among multiple receivers and revealing it at a later time
depending on his/her will, is one of the promising information sharing schemes which may address
practical security issues. In this work, we propose a novel quantum data hiding protocol. By
concatenating different subprotocols which apply to rather symmetric hiding scenarios, we cover a
variety of more general hiding scenarios. We provide the general requirements for constructing such
protocols and give explicit examples of encoding states for five parties. We also proved the security
of the protocol in sense that the achievable information by unauthorized operations asymptotically
goes to zero. In addition, due to the capability of the sender to manipulate his/her subsystem, the
sender is able to abort the protocol remotely at any time before he/she reveals the information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information security in the era of quantum informa-
tion science has changed dramatically [1–3]. With sub-
fields like quantum cryptography [4, 5], quantum tele-
portation [6–8], quantum network [9], error correction
codes [10, 11] etc., protocols for secure classical and quan-
tum information sharing have been developed and, in
some cases, implemented. While in the domain of classi-
cal steganography, applications have been made widely
in covert message sharing [12] and copyright protec-
tion [13], one also seeks to bridge these information shar-
ing schemes with quantum information since classical
protocols are generally fragile in the sense that they de-
pend on how well the senders keep the decoding strings
and the existence of eavesdroppers would potentially un-
dermine the security. Depending on whether the partici-
pants are allowed to have quantum communication, pro-
tocols are divided into two subcategories, namely quan-
tum secret sharing (QSS) [14, 15] where only local oper-
ations and classical communication (LOCC) are allowed
and quantum data hiding (QDH) [16, 17] where quantum
communication is allowed in certain ways. Experiments
have also demonstrated the possibility of sharing secrets
quantum systems [15].
In this work, we will be focusing on the part of quan-
tum data hiding applied to multiple parties, i.e., more
than two. Different from quantum secret sharing, the re-
ceivers in a quantum data hiding protocol are normally
assumed to be individually malevolent which means they
would do anything they could to decrypt the hidden in-
formation before the sender gives them the permission.
Previous studies have been made with such two par-
ties [16]. In that work, by utilizing the fact that the
four Bell states cannot be distinguished by only LOCC,
a classical information bit is securely encrypted in the
parity of the number of the singlet states in a series of
prepared Bell states. To later reveal the information, the
two parties are given access to a shared quantum commu-
nication channel which enables them to distinguish the
four Bell states easily.
Hiding information among multiple parties with quan-
tum states has also been discussed in [18, 19]. However,
these schemes will either require the allowed measure-
ments to be in special forms or have very specific hid-
ing structure considered. More general multipartite cases
have been studied in [20], but no example of the encod-
ing states was given and the protocol success probabilis-
tically. On the contrary, in this work, we will present a
new multipartite quantum data hiding protocol which
is equipped with new features mostly concerned with
improvements of security compared to previous proto-
cols [18, 19], but also provides more straightforward mea-
surements.
The security of all the previous quantum data hiding
protocols rely on the ability of the receivers to access
certain quantum channels. The receivers are able to per-
form quantum nonlocal operations to reveal the hidden
information given the authorization of the sender. We
show that this may not be the safest option when hiding
quantum data. Instead of relying on the authorization
of the sender for the security, the protocol in this work
enables the sender to hide the information bits securely
even though the receivers maliciously get unauthorized
access to quantum channel.
II. THE PROTOCOL
In a multipartite hiding scheme, comparing with the
bipartite case, one important aspect we need to con-
sider is how the receivers are collaborating with each
other, specifically the grouping style of the receivers un-
der which the information is hidden or revealed. For
instance, given a set of recievers {A,B,C,D}, a parti-
tion of {{A,B,C}, {D}}, where within the subgroups of
{A,B,C} or {D} quantum communication is allowed and
only classical communication between these two groups
is allowed, will have different requirements on the proto-
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2col compared to a partition of {{A,B}, {C,D}}. Thus,
while considering the hiding protocol under the multi-
partite case, one also needs to take the hiding structure
into account.
In a general setting, suppose a sender, denoted by S,
wants to share some bits of classical information to a
group of receivers, denoted by R. In the protocol, the
sender wants to achieve the hiding and revealing of the
bits only by modification (locally) on his/her part of the
shared quantum state, while on the other hand, the re-
ceivers try their best to decrypt the hidden bits even
though the sender has not given permission yet.
Let us use the quantum state |ψb〉 to represent the
hidden bits b ∈ {0, 1, ...,m−1} which the sender want to
share with the receivers. Unlike some typical protocols
of data hiding proposed before [16–18, 20], the sender S
here will still keep part of the system rather than sending
states completely to the receivers. It will be shown later
in section IV and V that such treatment will actually
improve the security in the hiding stage and also give
the sender the flexibility to abort the protocol locally.
The state on the receivers’ side before the sender reveals
or aborts will be
ρbR1R2... = TrS [|ψb〉SR1R2 ...], (1)
where Ri is the ith receiver.
In the hiding stage, the receivers are not able to guess
the correct secret b. The sender can also specify how the
receivers may collaborate with each other. For a partition
P = {P1,P2, ...}, where Pj is the jth subgroup of the
receivers among the set of the receivers R, the sender will
impose the restriction that only classical communication
could be made across Pjs and quantum communication
could be made inside each group Pj . The easiest way to
realize these constraints is to make all the reduced states
of the receivers to be the same, which is
ρbR1R2... = ρ
b′
R1R2..., (2)
(for b 6= b′)
This will guarantee that no matter what operation was
made inside the group Pj and classical communication
among Pjs, the receivers cannot differentiate the encod-
ing states for different b. We will show later in section IV
that the security in this hiding stage is unconditionally
secure.
The next stage is to reveal the secret. Since the sender
still has part of the quantum state, he/she could manip-
ulate the state in a way that will make the receivers able
to recover the secret. This is done by making a local
measurement on the sender’s side. Suppose the positive-
operator valued measure (POVM) elements correspond-
ing to the sender’s measurement are {Mi}, the state on
the receivers’ side after S made the measurement with
outcome t = 0, ...,m− 1 will be
σbt =
TrS [Mt |ψb〉 〈ψb|M†t ]
Tr[Mt |ψb〉 〈ψb|M†t ]
. (3)
The sender will then inform the receivers classically
with the outcome of the measurement, namely t. In this
protocol, the sender would like the receivers in each par-
tition Pj to collaborate nonlocally and receivers among
different subgroups collaborate classically to recover the
hidden information. To ensure this, we need to choose
the encoding states carefully such that they satisfy these
requirements. This simply means the states
Tr∪k 6=jPk [σ
b
t ], (4)
with fixed t are LOCC indistinguishable. To achieve this
goal, we propose the following subprotocol.
Subprotocol. Suppose there are a set of multipartite states
{|φl〉}, where |l| ≥ m, they satisfy a subprotocol if they
cannot be perfectly distinguished by LOCC. The set of
states {|φl〉} can also be divided into m subsets and the
m states ρi (i = 0, ...,m − 1), where each of them is the
uniform mixture of the states in each subset, also cannot
be perfectly distinguished by LOCC.
With the subprotocol defined above, for each subgroup
Pj , we can conveniently assign the state in (4) to one of
the uniform mixture ρbj . Thus, in a subprotocol, the
members in the subgroup Pj are attempting to recover
the information bj with the allowed measurements. As
stated already, only nonlocal measurement will enable
each group Pj to perfectly distinguish the information
bj .
In order to force the receivers among different subgroup
Pj to make classical communication to retrieve the hid-
den bits, the hidden bits b could take the form
b = t⊕ b1 ⊕ b2 ⊕ ...⊕ bn (mod m), (5)
where n is the total number of the subgroups and t is
the outcome of the POVM measurement made by the
sender. In each round of the hiding protocol, the sender
can decide a series {b1, b2, ..., bn} which will encode the
hidden bits b, and prepare the encoding state |ψb〉 with
the right subprotocol states ρbj . We will give examples
of how to construct the subprotocol later in section III.
We have described above the protocol of hiding and
revealing classical bits using quantum states. We will
also discuss the security in the section IV.
III. A CASE STUDY: HIDING WITH
{{A,B}, {C,D,E}}
In this section, we will show how could we construct
the quantum data hiding protocol as we described above
for a specific scenario, which has the receiver parti-
tion {{A,B}, {C,D,E}}. Our protocol states that in
the hiding stage, even though all the five members
{A,B,C,D,E} can make global quantum measurement,
they still cannot recover the hidden bit (we will restrict
to bit here and the generalization to multiple bits will
be discussed at the end of the section). In the reveal-
ing stage, on the contrary, the sender will require the
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FIG. 1: An example case of the protocol when there are
five receivers and the partition is {{A,B}, {C,D,E}}.
(a) The sender prepares the state in six subsystems. (b)
The sender distributes the subsystems to the receivers.
(c) The receivers make two groups in the hiding stage.
(d) The sender measures his/her qubit and announces
the measurement result to the receivers enabling them
to reveal the hidden information.
members in each subgroup to collaborate nonlocally to
recover the hidden bit. Different stages of the protocol
are depicted in Fig. 1.
We will first describe how we choose the states of the
subprotocol for the subgroup. Depending on the number
of parties in each subgroup, we may have different sub-
protocols. For the convenience of experimental realiza-
tion, we prefer that all the receivers will be given a qubit.
We will show that, with this restriction, the subprotocol
will be of different types for the first and second sub-
groups. The one we would like to adopt here for the first
subgroup {A,B} is the four Bell states protocol [16, 17].
Literally speaking, the four Bell states defined as |Φ±〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) and |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉), cannot be
perfectly distinguished with an infinite number of LOCC
’rounds’[17]. Thus, the subprotocol states ρb1 will be
ρb1 =
{
1
2 (|Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|+ |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|), if b1 = 0.
1
2 (|Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+|+ |Φ−〉 〈Φ−|), if b1 = 1.
(6)
On the other hand, for the second group {C,D,E}, we
will choose the unextendible product bases (UPB) [19,
21] for the subprotocol states. It has been shown in [22]
that any set of states make up a UPB are LOCC indistin-
guishable. Actually, for a subprotocol of more than two
parties, we can always define a UPB which involves only
qubits and is LOCC indistinguishable [23, 24] and thus
could be used for the construction of the subprotocol. A
neat and simple example of UPB states with three qubits
are
{|000〉 , |1e¯e〉 , |e1e¯〉 , |e¯e1〉}, (7)
where {|e〉 , |e¯〉} ∈ C2 and the two states are orthogo-
nal to each other but different than {|0〉 , |1〉} [23]. The
subprotocol states ρb2 can now be defined as
ρb2 =
{
1
2 (|000〉 〈000|+ |1e¯e〉 〈1e¯e|), if b2 = 0.
1
2 (|e1e¯〉 〈e1e¯|+ |e¯e1〉 〈e¯e1|), if b2 = 1.
(8)
With the two subprotocol states ready, we can now
write down the form of the encoding states |ψb〉. The
state |ψ0〉 will be chosen randomly from one of the fol-
lowing states
|ψ0〉 =
{
|0〉S |0∗〉AB |0#〉CDE + |1〉S |0∗〉AB |1#〉CDE ,
|0〉S |1∗〉AB |1#〉CDE + |1〉S |1∗〉AB |0#〉CDE ,
(9)
where the register of the receivers are labelled by b∗1
and b#2 , and |0∗〉 ∈ {|Ψ−〉 , |Φ+〉}, |1∗〉 ∈ {|Ψ+〉 , |Φ−〉},
|0#〉 ∈ {|000〉 , |1e¯e〉} and |1#〉 ∈ {|e1e¯〉 , |e¯e1〉}, and
moreover, they are all chosen randomly from each set.
Similarly, the state |ψ1〉 will be chosen randomly from
one of the following states
|ψ1〉 =
{
|0〉S |0∗〉AB |1#〉CDE + |1〉S |0∗〉AB |0#〉CDE ,
|0〉S |1∗〉AB |0#〉CDE + |1〉S |1∗〉AB |1#〉CDE ,
(10)
where |b∗1〉 and |b#2 〉 are chosen similarly as that for |ψ0〉.
With the states defined above, it can be checked that
they satisfy all the requirements we set for a quantum
data hiding protocol described in section II, and the cor-
responding measurement {Mi} of the sender will be the
projective measurement in the computational basis.
Regarding hiding multiple bits, it has been shown
in [16, 17] that the sender can simply encode the bits
into multiple parallel blocks of the above protocol. On
the other hand, as the formalism of our protocol does not
rely on the unique properties of the maximally entangled
states as in [16, 17], we do not have to restrict ourselves
to qubits case and can go further into the qudit case for
each of the parties. Since the UPB states are also avail-
able in higher dimensions [25, 26], to find proper states
for the multiple bits is not a difficult task.
IV. UPPER BOUND OF THE ATTAINABLE
INFORMATION
As suggested by the name of quantum data hiding,
the main purpose of the protocol is that the sender can
hide data among the receivers and then reveal the data
only if the receivers later perform authorized operations.
The security issue arises in two main aspects, namely,
4how well the protocol can hide the information bits and
how much can the sender assure that the receivers are
performing authorized operations.
We will first discuss the first aspect which is how well
the protocol can hide the bits in the hiding stage. Since
we assume the receivers to be malevolent, without loss of
generality, we can assume the measurement made by the
receivers to be a POVM {Nk}. The probability of the
receivers to guess the bits as i given the encoding states
as |ψb〉 will be
p(b|k) = Tr
[
Nk TrS [|ψb〉SR1R2 ...]N
†
k
]
. (11)
With the promise of (2) by the protocol, we know that
TrS [|ψb〉SR1R2 ...] is the same for all the values of b. Thus
the above probability will be
p(b|k) = 1
m
. (12)
Hence, in the hiding stage, the attainable information by
performing the POVM {Nk} will be the mutual informa-
tion
I(B : K) = log2m−
∑
k
p(k)H(B|K = k) (13)
= log2m−m×
1
m
×
∑
b
p(b|k) log2 p(b|k)
= 0,
where B and K corresponds to the events represented
by the random variable b and k. We have shown that
the information attainable by the receivers is zero in the
hiding stage. It should be stressed here that this is quite
special compared to previous QDH protocols [16, 18–20],
since the attainable information there are all at a finite
amount in the hiding stage.
Now, we turn to the discussion about how much can
the sender assure that the receivers are performing au-
thorized operations. The idea is the same, which is to
show how much information the receivers can attain by
unauthorized operations, which will be LOCC operations
in this case. Since the two subgroups are only allowed to
have classical channel, we can assume the POVM ele-
ments for each of the group to be {Pi}, {Qi} and etc. To
bound the attainable information Specifically, we want
to bound the mutual information
I(B;P,Q, ...) = H(B)−H(B|P,Q, ...)
≤H(B1)−H(B1|P ) +H(B2)−H(B2|Q) + ...
=I(B1;P ) + I(B2;Q) + ... (14)
The above equation simply tell us that the attainable
information about b is bounded by the sum of the at-
tainable information of the subprotocols. Thus, one only
needs to bound the attainable information of each sub-
prtocol. For a good protocol, one always wants to bound
this attainable information to zero. Here, we will use the
example in section III to show how this is achieved.
In the case of hiding a bit, it involves a two outcome
measurement for the subprotocol. Let us take the first
subgroup {A,B} as an example. It is shown in [17] that if
|p(b1 = 0|0)+p(b1 = 0|1)−1| ≤ δ, the mutual information
between B1 and P will be bounded by
I(B1;P ) ≤ δH(B1). (15)
Since the two states in the subprotocol is not perfectly
distinguishable by LOCC,
|p(b1 = 0|0) + p(b1 = 0|1)− 1| < 1. (16)
However, even if the value on the left hand side is smaller
than one, it is definitely not going to bound the mutual
information to be close to zero. To solve this problem, we
consider the case where the subprotocol is composed with
n parallel original subprotocols and the answering bit b1
is decided by the sum of the answering bit of each parallel
session (modulo 2). In this case, suppose p(0|0)+p(0|1) =
1 + p for the original subprotocol,
p(n)(0|0) + p(n)(0|1) ≤ 2
∑
i even
(1 + p)n−ipi
(
n
i
)
= 1 + pn. (17)
Since p ≤ 1 for all the subprotocols we chose, it will
suffice to bound the attainable information to a desired
small amount with large n. Thus, with enough resources,
the sender can always make sure that the receivers may
not recover the hidden bits with LOCC, which is not the
authorized operation.
V. BURN THE MESSAGE
When hiding data in the real world, even though the
sender could make his/her best to keep his/her subsystem
in the safest place, it is still possible that the eavesdrop-
per could make his/her way somehow to access it and
use it for some malicious purposes. A simple example is
that he/she could use it to send fake information to the
receivers which is not what the sender wished them to
see. The good thing of our protocol is that we allow the
sender to abort the protocol at any time before the infor-
mation was revealed. Let us say there is another POVM
{Ki} on the sender’s side. Mathematically speaking, we
require that the states in the protocol after the measure-
ment will be indistinguishable for all b,
TrS [Ki |ψb〉 〈ψb|K†i ]
Tr[Ki |ψb〉 〈ψb|K†i ]
= eiθbb′
TrS [Ki |ψb′〉 〈ψb′ |K†i ]
Tr[Ki |ψb′〉 〈ψb′ |K†i ]
,
(18)
for b 6= b′ up to a global phase eiθbb′ .
This means, immediately after S made the measure-
ment, the quantum state shared by all the parties is
erased to a state which cannot be used for information
sharing anymore. With the example in section III, the
corresponding measurement of the sender will just be the
measurement {|+〉 〈+| , |−〉 〈−|}.
5VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a novel quantum data hiding
protocol. The protocol extends the application scenario
to arbitrary multipartite settings. We give the general re-
quirements that the encoding states need to satisfy and
illustrate how one could construct such a protocol with
a specific example, which involves five parties. Since the
states in the example are all pure qubit states, it is rea-
sonable to say that the protocol is realizable with current
experimental capabilities. In addition, due to the special
construction of the encoding states, we proved that the
protocol is promised to be unconditionally safe in the hid-
ing stage, which is not the case for all previous protocols,
and the sender can reduce the possibility of the receivers
being cheating asymptotically to zero. Moreover, in sec-
tion V, we show that it is possible for the sender to abort
the data hiding protocol anytime before sending out the
revealing permission.
As for the outlook for future study, even though the
case for higher dimensional system is promised to be
existing, we still need to find an explicit construction.
Moreover, while we are parallelizing the subprotocol in
section III to make the attainable information asymp-
totic zero, we assumed that the decoding strategy for the
receivers cannot be better than measuring each block sep-
arately and then combine the results. Even though this is
also assumed in previous works [17], we still look forward
to a proof without such assumption.
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